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This paper develops a life-cycle approach to equilibrium unemployment. Workers only differ 
respectively to their distance from deterministic retirement. A non age-directed search 
equilibrium is then typically featured by increasing (decreasing) firing (hiring) rates with age 
and a hump-shaped age profile for employment. Because of intergenerational inefficiencies, 
the Hosios condition no longer achieves efficiency. We then explore the optimal age-pattern 
of some policy tools to restore this efficiency. The optimal profile for employment subsidies 
should increase with age, whereas firing taxes and hirings subsidies would have to be hump-
shaped. Lastly, we examine the robustness of our results. We show that age-directed 
recruitment policies cannot exist in equilibrium even if it would have been ex-ante possible, 
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Since Oi [1962], labor is conventionally viewed as a quasi-￿xed input factor.
The hiring process is costly and ￿rms implement labor hoarding strategies:
forward looking decisions of hiring and ￿ring depend on the time over which
to recoup adjustment costs. A major contribution of the extensively used
framework of Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] (MP hereafter) is to provide
theoretical foundations to these mechanisms in a overall theory of equilib-
rium unemployment with matching frictions and wage bargaining. In that
context, endogenous hirings and separations depend on expected duration
of jobs. Surprisingly enough, the life cycle of workers has not been yet in-
corporated in equilibrium unemployment models whereas this duration is
obviously tightly related to the distance from worker’s retirement. This is as
much surprising as the relation between the labor supply and the life cycle
was already pointed out since the seminal Heckman [1974] and MaCurdy
[1981] papers. Seater [1974], Hutchens [1988] and more recently Lunqjvist
and Sargent [2002] also emphasized the role played by the life cycle in the
search decision of unemployed workers, both from theoretical and empirical
standpoints. This paper aims at ￿lling this gap by examining positive and
normative issues related to the introduction of the life cycle in the theory of
equilibrium unemployment.
Traditionally, the labor market equilibrium is analyzed by taking into
account speci￿c labor market institutions like employment protection (Blan-
chard and Portugal [2001]), unemployment insurance (Lunqvist and Sargent
[2004]) or tax system and government (Prescott [2004], Rogerson [2006]).
These studies do not recognize the employment di￿erences by age as central.
In this paper, we put forward the idea that adopting a life cycle view may
enhance our understanding of the labor market equilibrium. Indeed, Figure
1 shows ￿rstly that employment rates di￿er across ages whatever the coun-
try considered. The age-dynamics of employment is hump-shaped: younger
and older workers display lower employment rates. Secondly, as can be seen
in ￿gure 1, employment rate di￿erences across countries seem to be concen-
trated at particular ages: there exists large heterogeneity of employment rates
among OECD countries for the youngest and the oldest workers1, whereas
the employment rates for workers between 30 and 50 years old are very low
dispersed (see also OECD [2006]).
In this paper, we aim at showing that the canonical MP model augmented
by life cycle features naturally delivers outcomes which are qualitatively in
1Note that we consider employment rates for people aged of less than 60 years in order
to not capture di￿erences in labor participation due to di￿erent normal retirement ages.
2Figure 1: Employment rates by age groups










































Source: OECD data (2000) for men. Age groups: 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49,
50-54, 55-59.
accordance with these stylized facts, even if other factors2 are necessary to
quantitatively explain all of them. Moreover, from a normative standpoint,
we think that it is important to propose a theoretical framework able to
give some insights on the optimality of age-designed policies. A lot of coun-
tries have implemented anti-age discrimination policy and some have experi-
mented with job protection, unemployment bene￿ts or employment subsidies
di￿erentiated by age3. What are their impact? Are there any rationales un-
der these policies? If any, what would be the age pro￿le of these policies?
Our paper is a ￿rst contribution in the equilibrium unemployment framework
to these questions.
We propose an equilibrium unemployment model as standard as possible
in the line of Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] (MP hereafter). The exis-
tence of search frictions imply that there is a costly delay in the process of
￿lling vacancies, and endogenous job destructions closely interact with job
creations. Wages are determined according to a standard Nash bargaining4.
2One may think of the depreciation of human capital and the existence of pre-retirement
systems at the end of working life, whereas the employment of the youth may depend a
lot on the e￿ciency of the educational institutions and the hiring process.
3In Belgium, Finland, France Japan or Korea, it is more costly for ￿rms to lay o￿ older
workers because of longer notice periods or higher severance pay. In Belgium or France,
there exists more generous unemployment bene￿ts at the end of the working life. In the
UK or France, hirings of workers of more than 50 are subsidized.
4This approach has been recently criticized by Shimer [2005] and Hall [2005] as it
underestimates the ￿uctuations of unemployment and vacancy. Taking into account real
3Contrary to the large literature following MP, we consider a life cycle setting
characterized by a deterministic age at which workers exit the labor market.
There is no more heterogeneity than the distance to retirement. We consider
that this is a natural starting point to which other potential sources of het-
erogeneity across workers of di￿erent ages could be added5. We also consider
in our benchmark economy that ￿rms cannot ex-ante age-direct their search,
that is vacancies cannot be targeted on a speci￿c age group as the result
of the legislation prohibiting age-discrimination6. Consistently, unemployed
workers are randomly matched with available job vacancies irrespective of
their age.
The ￿rst contribution of this paper is to reveal the direct in￿uence of
impending retirement on both job creations and destructions. We show that
extending MP’s framework to account for a deterministic exit date from the
labor market naturally deliver a hump-shaped age-dynamics of employment.
On the one hand, because the horizon of older workers is shorter, we show
that ￿rms invest less in labor-hoarding activities at the end of the life cycle.
This implies that the ￿ring (hiring) rate increases (decreases) with the age
of the worker, so that the employment rate is falling at the end of the life-
cycle. We argue that di￿erences in retirement ages can account for observed
di￿erences in employment rates of older workers: more or less longer horizon
of the worker on the labor market appears as a key variable to understand
either smoother or sharper decrease in the employment rate from 50 years
old on. On the other hand, since new entrants are unemployed, low ￿ring
rates at the beginning of the working life cycle make the employment rate
increasing with age until a threshold age.
If the low employment rate of older workers can be explained by the
short horizon created by the coming retirement, the next issue is then to
examine the social optimality of such outcomes. Before engineering any
policy devices to circumvent ￿rms to discriminate against older workers, it
is necessary to study the social optimality of such behaviors. In the context
wage rigidities as suggested by Shimer [2005] and Hall [2005] would exacerbate the life
cycle impact on job ￿ows as emphasized in section 1.
5For instance, one could think that older workers have much more job-speci￿c skills and
su￿er more from separations. The amount of idiosyncratic uncertainty could be weaker
for older workers. The bargaining power of younger and older workers is not necessary the
same...
6This legislation in the US dates back to the 60’s (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act in 1967, and subsequent amendments). In 2000, the European Union Council Directive
also requires all 15 EU countries to introduce legislation prohibiting direct and indirect
discrimination at work on the grounds of age.
4of matching frictions and wage bargaining, it is now well-established that
the decentralized equilibrium is in general not optimal, except when the
Hosios condition holds.7 In the life-cycle equilibrium, as ￿rms are engaged
in a non age-directed search, the age distribution of the unemployed workers
determines the return of vacancies. Older worker job destructions exert a
negative externality on the employment of the younger unemployed workers
which is not internalized by ￿rms in the decentralized equilibrium. This is
why the Hosios condition is not enough to restore the social optimality of
the life-cycle equilibrium: there are too much (not enough) older (younger)
worker job destructions even though the optimal pro￿le of job destructions
is increasing with age as in the equilibrium outcome.
We then de￿ne the policies which could restore the e￿ciency of the de-
centralized equilibrium. We expect that the intergenerational externalities
may be corrected by policies designed by age. More speci￿cally, older worker
job destructions must be reduced in order to limit the number of older un-
employed workers likely to be contacted by ￿rms. We show that the optimal
design of employment subsidies is increasing with age: older worker jobs are
the more subsidized whereas younger worker jobs are even taxed. Optimal
￿ring and hiring policies could also be implemented, but in a more complex
way. Indeed, the sensitivity of ￿rm’s ￿ring policy with respect to employ-
ment protection is age-dependent. Namely, ￿ring taxes are more e￿cient in
the last stages of the life cycle when ￿rms have strong incentives to wait for
older worker retirement as a way of escaping from ￿ring taxes. More pre-
cisely, at the end of the working cycle, introducing a ￿ring tax increases the
present ￿ring cost without any future consequences on the job value as the
worker will be retired in the next period. On the opposite, for a younger
worker, the ￿ring decision depends not only on the current tax but also on
the expected one. We show that, everything being equal, this would require
the age-dynamics of the ￿ring tax to be decreasing. Combining this e￿ect
with the intergenerational externality leads to a hump-shaped feature for the
optimal age-dynamics of the ￿ring taxes, hence of hiring subsidies.
Lastly, in order to assess the scope of these results, we test the robust-
ness of our model’s implications with respect to the assumption of non-age
directed search and constant search e￿ort for unemployed workers. First,
we show that even though age-directed recruiting policies was possible, the
equilibrium would feature only non-directed recruitment policies. This result
7This condition states that the elasticity of the matching friction with respect to vacan-
cies should be equal to worker’s bargaining power (Hosios [1990]). This e￿ciency result
could also be obtained in a competitive search equilibrium (Moen [1997]).
5is tightly related with the assumption that there is no age-dependent ability
requirement associated with a vacant position. This actually implies that all
unemployed workers, whatever their age, are eager to apply to age-directed
vacant positions, so that in equilibrium only non-directed recruitment policies
exist. Secondly, as unemployed search e￿ort corresponds to an investment,
we show that it adds another force to explain why older worker employment
may be lower due to a shorter horizon. Unemployed older workers exhibit
a lower search e￿ort than younger workers. Interestingly, this pro￿le is also
present in the social optimum. Furthermore, the social return of older worker
search is not only lower due to the shorter horizon, as it is perceived by work-
ers, but it also negatively impacts the return of ￿rm vacancies. This is why
the pro￿le of unemployment search subsidies should be decreasing with age.
The older worker search is less worthy to be encouraged as it exerts a partic-
ularly negative externality on the younger unemployed workers by lowering
the job vacancies in the economy.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. A ￿rst section de-
scribes the model and discusses equilibrium properties as regard with some
empirical facts. The second section turns to e￿ciency and labor policy is-
sues. A third section is devoted to the robustness analysis. A last section
concludes the paper.
2 Equilibrium Life Cycle Dynamics of Job Cre-
ations and Job Destructions
Let us consider an economy ￿ la Mortensen - Pissarides [1994]. Labor market
frictions imply that there is a costly delay in the process of ￿lling vacancies,
and endogenous job destructions closely interact with job creations. Con-
trary to the large literature following MP, we consider a life cycle setting
characterized by a deterministic age at which workers exit the labor market.
2.1 Model Environment
We consider a discrete time model and assume that at each period the older
worker generation retiring from the labor market is replaced by a younger
worker generation of the same size (normalized to unity) so that there is no
labor force growth in the economy. We denote i the worker’s age and T the
exogenous age at which workers exit the labor market: they are both perfectly
known by employers. There is no other heterogeneity across workers. The
economy is at steady-state, and we do not allow for any aggregate uncertainty.
6We assume that each worker of the new generation enters the labor market
as unemployed.
2.1.1 Shocks
Firms are small and each has one job. The destruction ￿ows derive from
idiosyncratic productivity shocks that hit the jobs at random. Once a shock
arrives, the ￿rm has no choice but either to continue production or to destroy
the job. Then, for age i 2 (2;T ¡ 1), employed workers are faced with
layo￿s when their job becomes unpro￿table. At the beginning of each age8,
a job productivity ² is drawn in the general distribution G(²) with ² 2 [0;²].
The ￿rms decide to close down any jobs whose productivity is below an
(endogenous) productivity threshold (productivity reservation) denoted Ri.
Job creation takes place when a ￿rm and a worker meet. The ￿ow of newly
created jobs result from a matching function the inputs of which are vacancies
and unemployed workers. This ￿ow also depends on productivity thresholds
Ri because it is assumed that productivity values ² are known after ￿rm and
worker met.
2.1.2 Workers ￿ows with non age-directed search
We assume that ￿rms cannot ex-ante age-direct their search and that the
matching function embodies all unemployed workers. Let u be the number
of unemployment workers, v the vacancies, and assume at this stage that
worker search e￿ort is exogenous. There is a matching function that gives
the number of hirings as a function of the number of vacancies and the
number of unemployed workers, M(v;u), where M is increasing and concave
in both its arguments, and with constant returns-to-scale. Let µ = v=u
denote the tightness of the labor market. It is then straightforward to de￿ne
the probability for unemployed workers of age i to be employed at age i+1,
as jci ´ p(µ)[1 ¡ G(Ri+1)] with p(µ) =
M(u;v)
u . Similarly, we de￿ne the job
destruction rate for an employed worker of age i as jdi = G(Ri).
At the beginning of their age i, the realization of the productivity level
on each job is revealed. Workers hired when they were i ¡ 1 years old (at
the end of the period) are now productive. Workers whose productivity is
below the reservation productivity Ri are either laid o￿ or not hired (for
those previously unemployed). For any age i, the ￿ow from employment to
unemployment is then equal to G(Ri)(1 ¡ ui¡1). The other workers who
8This assumption is done to allow for analytical results. Persistency of shocks is leaved
for a quantitative empirical investigation of the model performance.
7remain employed (1 ¡ G(Ri))(1 ¡ ui¡1) can renegotiate their wage. The
age-dynamics of unemployment is then given by:
ui+1 = ui [1 ¡ p(µ)(1 ¡ G(Ri+1))] + G(Ri+1)(1 ¡ ui) 8i 2 (1;T ¡ 1) (1)
for a given initial condition u1 = 1. The overall level of unemployment is
u =
PT¡1
i=1 ui, so that the average unemployment rate is u=[T ¡ 1].
2.2 Hiring and Firing Decisions
Any ￿rm is free to open a job vacancy and engage in hiring. c denotes the
￿ow cost of recruiting a worker and ¯ 2 [0;1] the discount factor. Let V be
the expected value of a vacant position and Ji(²) the value of a ￿lled job with
productivity ²:










+ ¯(1 ¡ q(µ))V
Vacancies are determined according to the expected value of a contact with an
unemployed worker. This expected value depends on the age distribution of
the unemployed workers. Heterogeneity across ages in ￿lled job values and in
productivity thresholds imply the existence of intergenerational externalities
in the search process. The probability of contact not only depends on the
overall number of unemployed workers but also on the age distribution of
this population. Typically, the more older unemployed workers are, the less
is the expected return of a vacancy. The zero-pro￿t condition V = 0 allows














For a bargained wage wi(²), the expected value Ji(²) of a ￿lled job by a
worker of age i is de￿ned by:
Ji(²) = ² ¡ wi(²) + ¯
Z ²
Ri+1
Ji+1(x)dG(x) + ¯G(Ri+1)V 8i 2 [1;T ¡ 1] (3)
It is worth emphasizing that the deterministic exit at age T leads to an ex-
ogenous job destruction, whatever the productivity realization: JT(²) = 0 8².
8Taking into account of the free entry V = 0, the (endogenous) job de-
struction rule Ji(²) < 0 leads to a reservation productivity Ri de￿ned by
Ji(Ri) = 0 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 1]:
Ri = wi(Ri) ¡ ¯
Z ²
Ri+1
Ji+1(x)dG(x) 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 1] (4)
The higher the wage, the higher the reservation productivity, and hence the
higher the job destruction ￿ows. On the other hand, the higher the option
value of ￿lled jobs (expected gains in the future), the weaker the job destruc-
tions. Because the job value vanishes at the end of the working life, labor
hoarding of older workers is less pro￿table. It is again worth determining the
terminal age condition: RT¡1 = wT¡1(RT¡1).
Property 1. For an exogenous and constant wage w, the reservation pro-
ductivity is solving:




with terminal conditions RT¡1 = w, which implies Ri+1 ¸ Ri 8i.
Proof. Assume wi(²) = w 8i;², then J0
i(²) = 1, so that Ji(Ri) = 0 entails





i+1(x)[1 ¡ G(x)]dx =
R ²
Ri+1[1 ¡ G(x)]dx, we ￿nd Ri. Let reason back-
ward from i = T ¡ 1 to i = 2, remaining of the proof is straightforward.
Because the horizon of older workers is shorter, ￿rms invest less in labor-
hoarding activities at the end of the life cycle. older workers are more vul-
nerable to idiosyncratic shocks, that is Ri+1 ¸ Ri for a given w.
2.3 The Wage Bargaining
The rent associated with a job is divided between the employer and the
worker according to a wage rule. Following the most common speci￿cation,
wages are determined by the Nash solution to a bargaining problem9.
9Recently, this wage setting rule has been somewhat disputed (See e.g. Shimer [2005]
and Hall [2005]). We leave for future research the exploration of alternative wage rules.
9Values of employed (on a job of productivity ²) and unemployed workers
of any age i, 8i < T, are respectively given by:













+(1 ¡ p(µ))Ui+1] (6)
with b ¸ 0 denoting the opportunity cost of employment.10
For a given bargaining power of the workers, considered as constant across
ages, the global surplus generated by a job, Si ´ Ji(²) + Wi(²) ¡ Ui, is
divided according to the following sharing rule which is the solution of the
conventional Nash bargaining problem:
Wi(²) ¡ Ui = ° [Ji(²) + Wi(²) ¡ Ui] (7)
As in MP, a crucial implication of this rule is that the job destruction is
optimal not only from the ￿rm’s point of view but also from that of the
worker. Ji(Ri) = 0 indeed entails Wi(Ri) = Ui. Accordingly, the equilibrium
wage rule solves (see appendix B.1 for details on derivation):
wi(²) = °² + (1 ¡ °)[Ui ¡ ¯Ui+1] (8)
The wage is a weighted average of productivity and the reservation wage
of workers. As in Pissarides [2000], and in order to state how turn-over costs
interact with the wage bargaining process, a more appealing version of this
wage equation may be derived by using equilibrium conditions (again see
appendix B.1):
wi(²) = ° [² + cµ¿i] + (1 ¡ °)b (9)






















As in Pissarides, the way that market tightness enters the wage equation is
through the bargaining strength each party has: a higher µ ´
1=q(µ)
1=p(µ) indicates
10We assume that WT = UT so that the social security provisions do not a￿ect the wage
bargaining and the labor market equilibrium.
10that expected unemployment duration (1=p(µ)) is relatively shorter than ex-
pected duration of a job vacancy (1=q(µ)); worker’s bargaining strength is
relatively higher and this leads to a higher wage rate. It is worth to empha-
size that the way market tightness enters the wage equation in our model
depends on the worker age through the variable ¿i. This variable gives the
value of a worker hired at age i relative to the expected value of a job ac-
cording to the age distribution of unemployed workers11. ¿i decreases with
age. This means that drawing a young worker is worthier than an old one for
the ￿rm; its job value is greater than the average job value. A young worker
has then to be rewarded for more than the saving of the average search costs
(cµ). This implies that the bargaining strength of a young worker is greater
than that of an old worker, and, consequently, for a given productivity level
², that the wage is lower for a worker of age i + 1 than for a worker of age i,
wi+1(²) · wi(²). Ultimately, we have wT¡1(²) = °² + (1 ¡ °)b.
This individual age-dynamics feature of wages is however likely to be
overcome by the fact that the average productivity of jobs is increasing with
ages, because (in equilibrium) ￿rms are more reluctant to keep older workers.
The next section will precisely deal with this equilibrium composition e￿ect.12
Accordingly, combining the equation (4) with this wage equation, we may
restate in a life cycle context the condition showing that a job is destroyed
when the expected pro￿t from the marginal job (current product plus option
value from expected productivity shocks) fails to cover the worker’s reserva-












from (4), (7) and (2). The reservation wage is the sum of the unemployment
bene￿ts and the net return of the search activity. This return for the young
workers is obviously higher than the average return, as ¿i > 1.
11So that we typically have ¿1 > 1 for the youngest workers and ¿T¡1 < 1 for the oldest
ones, or more generally ¿i+1 · ¿i.
12From the individual perspective, one could also allow the model to account for exoge-
nous human capital accumulation. We will also address this concern in the next section
when dealing with the equilibrium age-pro￿le of wages.
112.4 Life-Cycle Labor Market Equilibrium
The primary objective of this section is to examine the equilibrium age dy-
namics of labor market ￿ows and employment.
2.4.1 Equilibrium age-dynamics of job creation and job destruc-
tion
Proposition 1. A labor market equilibrium with wage bargaining exists and
it is characterized by:
c
q(µ)





















+ (1 ¡ °)b
ui+1 = ui [1 ¡ p(µ)(1 ¡ G(Ri+1))] + G(Ri+1)(1 ¡ ui)
with terminal condition RT¡1 = b and a given initial condition u1.
Proof. Let notice that (by integrating by parts)
R ²
Ri+1 Ji+1(x)dG(x) = (1 ¡
°)
R ²
Ri+1[1¡G(x)]dx, the proof is then straightforward by combining (1), (2),
(4), (8).
By de￿nition of jdi = G(Ri) and jci = p(µ)[1 ¡ G(Ri)], the produc-
tivity threshold Ri is the only variable that determines the shape of the
age-dynamics of labor market ￿ows.
Property 2. The age-dynamics of job creations and job destructions are
governed by the sequence fRig
T¡1
i=2 which solves:




with terminal conditions RT¡1 = b, so that the equilibrium is characterized
by Ri+1 ¸ Ri, jdi+1 ¸ jdi and jci+1 · jci 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 1]
Proof. Straightforward from proposition 1, and by solving backward the age-
dynamics of Ri starting with the terminal condition RT¡1 = b.
12Interestingly, this property states that, despite an individual age-declining
pro￿le of wages, the fall in labor hoarding with age is important enough to
lead job creation (destruction) to decrease (increase) with age. Older workers
are more vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. A shortened horizon relative to
younger workers make them more exposed to ￿rings. Otherwise stated, this
re￿ects that labor-hoarding decreases with worker’s age. In turn, it creates
a downward pressure on the hirings of older workers. As only the more
productive of older workers remain at work, it may be noted that the average
wage can increase with age due to a composition e￿ect.
Figure 2: Age-dynamics of the employment rate: an illustration











































Annual calibration: i = 1 refers to 16 years old workers with u1 = 1. G(²) = ², 8² 2 [0;1],
p(µ) = ¡µÃ with an intermediate value T = 63, and ¯ = :96, b = :43, Ã = ° = :6 from
conventional external informations. ¡ = 1:15 and c = :78 consistent with 30-40 years old
average employment rate of 90%, and 1% ratio of recruiting costs to average output.
2.4.2 The age-dynamics of the employment rate
The age pro￿le of hirings and ￿rings has been recursively determined from
terminal conditions. On the other hand, the age pro￿le of unemployment ui
(or employment ni = 1 ¡ ui) depends on the arbitrary initial condition u1.
This explains why it is ambiguous:
ui ?
G(Ri+1)
[1 ¡ p(µ)]G(Ri+1) + p(µ)
) ni+1 ? ni 8i
Property 3. For u1 = 1, there exists a threshold age ~ T so that ni ¸
ni¡1 8i · ~ T and ni · ni¡1 8i ¸ ~ T.
13Proof. See Appendix C.1.
In the case where all the new entrants are unemployed, high vacancy
rates and low ￿ring rates at the beginning of the working life cycle make the
employment rate increasing with age until the age ~ T. Until this threshold age,
this increase in employment rate is simply the result of a queue phenomenon.
From ~ T on, the employment rate evolution by age mimics the age pro￿le of
￿rings and hirings. The overall age-dynamics of employment is thus hump-
shaped, as found in OECD data (see Figure 1). The ￿gure 2 put further
emphasis on this point by providing an illustrative simulation of the model
for a standard calibration. It must be emphasized that the model is able
to generate large variations of employment rates over the life cycle. The
employment rate increases slowly and reaches its maximum around 40 years
old as in most OECD countries. This illustrates the queue phenomenon in
the model which mainly depends on the hiring process. After these ages,
the coming retirement age reverses the pro￿le of the employment rate as the
result of the increase of the ￿rings at the end of the working life. One again,
this pattern seems consistent with the data and reinsures us that this model
could be also well-suited for quantitative analysis.
2.4.3 The Age Pro￿le of Wages
Since the seminal empirical work of Mincer [1962], it is well-known that the
wage increases with age and declines at the end of the life cycle. This stylized
fact can be explained in our model simply by including general human capital
accumulation so that: hi+1 = (1 + ¹)hi where the productivity of the job is
now given by hi² which counteracts the negative impact of shorter horizon
on wages, according to the value of the growth rate ¹ ¸ 0. Assuming that
bi ´ bhi, it is straightforward to see that the shape of job creations and job
destructions is not altered by this assumption, since in such a case we would
have:




so that Ri+1 ¸ Ri 8i. However, it is obvious that the level of job creations
and job destructions depends on the growth rate ¹.
Property 4. The lowest wage paid to employed workers is strictly increasing
with age, that is wi+1(Ri+1) > wi(Ri), 8i.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
The property 4 emphasizes that there exists a composition e￿ect on wages:
at the end of the life cycle, ￿rms hoard their workers less (the reservation
14productivity increases with the age of the worker, Ri+1 ¸ Ri), so that only
the more productive remain at work. This might lead the average wage to
increase with age even in the absence of human capital accumulation.
2.4.4 Distance from retirement instead of age
An important dimension of the model is the retirement age. Only the dis-
tance between the current age and the retirement age matters according to a
horizon e￿ect. On the contrary, the biological age does not matter in itself.
Property 5. For two retirement ages, T and T + N, we have RT¡1¡i =
RT+N¡1¡i, so that jcT¡1¡i = jcT+N¡1¡i, and jdT¡1¡i = jdT+N¡1¡i 8i.
Proof. Property 2 emphasizes that for all T we have the same terminal con-
dition: for two retirement ages, T and T + N, RT¡1 = RT+N¡1 = b. Then,
from backward induction, it comes that RT¡1¡i = RT+N¡1¡i 8i.
Figure 3: Employment rates from age 30 to 64 for OECD Countries
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Source: OECD data for 1995 (authors’ calculation). In each country, each bar
refers to employment rates of the age groups : 30 - 49 (￿rst bar on the left), 50 -
54, 55 - 59 and 60 - 64 (last bar on the right)
15Figure 4: The impact of retirement age (RA) on employment: a quantitative
illustration














































































































Annual calibration: i = 1 refers to 16 years old workers with u1 = 1. G(²) = ², 8² 2 [0;1],
p(µ) = ¡µÃ with ¯ = :96, b = :43, Ã = ° = :6, ¡ = 1:15 and c = :78.
16This may explain why countries experience a drop in their employment
rate before the normal retirement age. Figure 3 shows that the fall in the
employment rate of older worker is steeper when the retirement age gets
closer, whatever the country considered. Two country groups emerged very
clearly in the mid-nineties: those with high employment rates for workers
aged 55-59 (Canada, Great Britain, Japan, the United States and Sweden)
and those which already experienced a huge decrease in employment rates at
these ages, around 25 points with respect to the 50-54 age group (Belgium,
France, Italy and the Netherlands). As documented by Gruber and Wise
[1999], the second group of countries is characterized by an e￿ective retire-
ment age of 60 (versus 65 in the ￿rst group). There is no reason to believe
that these countries are more sensitive to the ongoing technological progress;
they just display a lower retirement age.
Face to this huge decline in the employment rate just before the retirement
rate, is our streamlined model able to generate quantitatively such outcomes
for a standard calibration? It is not say that the horizon e￿ect is enough
to explain this decline alone. We aim to show that this e￿ect has strong
predictive power, and is not only a theoretical curiosity. The numerical
experiment reproduced in Figure 4 put emphasis on this point. In panel A,
OECD data show the decreasing shape of the employment rate by age for
12 countries. These 12 countries are characterized by 6 o￿cial retirement
ages (RA): 60, 63, 64, 65, 67 and 69. By simulating the model for these
6 retirement ages, panel B gives an illustration of the property 5: starting
from a similar level for the workers of age 45, the employment rates di￿ers
by a large amount 10 years later. It is less than 60% for country with a
retirement age at 60, and more 85% for a retirement age at 69. It illustrates
the large elasticity of the employment rate to the retirement age in our model.
It can be noticed that the employment rate for the 50-54 age group when
the retirement age is 60 is equivalent to the employment rate of the 55-60
age group in a country with a retirement age at 65. Finally, Panel C shows
that the magnitude of this horizon e￿ect is in accordance with the observed
heterogeneity of the employment rates in the 55-59 age group.
3 E￿ciency and Labor Market Policy in a Life-
Cycle Setting
The previous section showed that job separations (creations) occur more
(less) at the end of the working life in our theoretical life-cycle setting. This
result seems consistent with facts as it has been documented by OECD [2006].
17This feature is sometimes interpreted as a discrimination against older work-
ers, whereas our analysis shows that there exists rational arguments which
push ￿rms to di￿erentiate their hiring and ￿ring policies between worker
ages. However, it remains to show that this behavior is not at odds with
the social optimality. Traditionally, the equilibrium unemployment frame-
work is known as generating congestion e￿ects which take the decentralized
equilibrium away from the e￿cient allocation. However, when the elastic-
ity relative to vacancies in the matching function is equal to the bargaining
power of ￿rms (Hosios condition), the social optimality can be reached. Does
this result still hold when life-cycle features are considered? The existence
of a speci￿c externality, namely an intergenerational externality, could lead
to reconsider this result obtained in an in￿nite horizon. In this case, speci￿c
policies, in particular designed by age, should be implemented to restore the
social optimality.
First, we show that the Hosios condition breaks down in a life cycle set-
ting. Secondly, we propose age-designed policies to deal with the intergener-
ational externality in the search process.
3.1 Intergenerational Externality and the E￿cient Al-
location
We derive the optimal allocation by maximizing the steady-state output with
respect to labor market tightness µ? and reservation productivity for each age,
R?
i. Accordingly, the comparison of the optimal solution with the equilibrium
one will be done by considering the case ¯ ! 1.















subject to the unemployment dynamics and the output equation respectively:
ui+1 = G(R
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Proposition 2. Let ´(µ?) = 1 ¡
µ?p0(µ?)
p(µ?) , the maximum value of steady-state





































Proof. See appendix C.3.


















is not age-dependent, that is one
can examine the age-dynamics of Ri by de￿ning













This proposition emphasizes that higher (lower) job destruction (creation)
rates for older workers is not only an equilibrium outcome but also an e￿cient
age-pattern of labor market ￿ows. Because of their shorter horizon, older
workers must be more ￿red and less hired. However, this does not imply that
the equilibrium level of job ￿ows is consistent with the e￿cient allocation.
Proposition 3. The Hosios condition, ´(µ?) = °, no longer achieves e￿-
ciency in our life cycle setting.
Proof. Straightforward by comparing the expression of R?
i in proposition 2
and Ri in property 2.
To see the rationale for this result, it is more convenient to restate the



































By comparison to the equilibrium condition (10), and contrary to Pis-
sarides [2000], it is obvious that the Hosios condition ° = ´(µ?) no longer
achieves e￿ciency in our framework because the equilibrium is no longer
symmetric, that is ¿i 6= 1. The left-hand side of (13) represents the expected
pro￿t from the marginal job occupied by a worker of age i. The right-hand
side corresponds to the social marginal value of an unemployed worker of




i ), plus the value that this age i unemployed
workers provides through her impact on the average search value (cµ?(¿?
i ¡1)).
The Hosios condition ° = ´(µ?) allows the private agents to internalize tradi-
tional search externalities in the decentralized equilibrium. However, because
the last term cµ?(¿?
i ¡1) in the social value of unemployment does not appear
in the equilibrium condition (10), the Hosios condition no longer achieves ef-
￿ciency. This last term re￿ects that the social value of the search activity
is not symmetrical: because a young (old) worker increases (decreases) the
average search value in the economy, the social value of the young (old) un-
employed worker is larger (smaller) than its market value. Hence, contrary
to the ￿rms, the planner takes into account the impact of a particular unem-
ployed worker of age i on the search process. Compared to Pissarides [2000],
our life-cycle framework introduces another externality, namely an intergen-
erational externality. The planner internalizes that ￿rings of older (younger)
worker, by increasing unemployment of this age-type of workers, reduce (in-
crease) the average value of vacancies. On the contrary, ￿rms neither take
into account that ￿rings of older workers reduce the average value of a job
match nor that ￿ring of younger workers increase this average value.
Overall, this suggests that the e￿cient rate of job destructions for older
(younger) workers is lower (higher) than at equilibrium. The examination of
the age-pattern of optimal labor policies will put emphasis on this result.
3.2 The Equilibrium with Policies
The design of age-dependent labor market policies may allow ￿rms to inter-
nalize the intergenerational externality in their ￿ring policy. Traditionally,
the optimality can be restored either by employment subsidies/taxes or by
￿ring and hiring subsidies/taxes. Following the same approach, we introduce
20these policies, but potentially di￿erentiated by age. In order to speci￿cally
deal with the intergenerational externality, we assume that the Hosios con-
dition holds hereafter.
Let us denote ai an employment subsidy for the worker, Fi a ￿ring tax
which refers to the implicit costs in mandated employment protection legisla-
tion and in experience-rated unemployment insurance taxes, and Hi a hiring
subsidy. We consider a two-tier wage structure in line with Mortensen and
Pissarides [1999] and Pissarides [2000].
Proposition 4. A labor market equilibrium with wage bargaining and labor
market policies exists, it is characterized by:
c
q(µ)








[x ¡ Ri+1 + Hi+1 ¡ Fi+1]dG(x)
¶¸







[x ¡ Ri+1 + Hi+1 ¡ Fi+1]dG(x)
ui+1 = ui [1 ¡ p(µ)(1 ¡ G(Ri+1))] + G(Ri+1)(1 ¡ ui)
with terminal condition RT¡1 = b¡aT¡1¡FT¡1 and a given initial condition
u1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.3 The Optimal Age-Dynamics of Employment Subsi-
dies
We ￿rst determine the employment subsidy policy suitable in the life cycle
framework. We thus assume ´(µ?) = ° and Fi = Hi = 0;8i.
Property 7. Let consider ¯ ! 1 and ´(µ?) = °, an optimal age-sequence









i are de￿ned by proposition 2.
Proof. Straightforward by comparing propositions 2 and 4 and recalling that R ²
R?




21Corollary 1. The optimal age-dynamics of employment subsidies is increas-
ing with age, a?
i+1 > a?
i 8i 2 [0;T ¡ 1], and there exists a threshold age ~ t
such that ai · 0 8i 2 [0;~ t] and ai ¸ 0 8i 2 [~ t;T ¡ 1].
Proof. Straightforward since from R?
i+1 ¸ R?
i, we have ¿?
i+1 · ¿?
i and ¿1 > 1,
¿T¡1 < 1.
As the younger (older) workers exert a positive (negative) externality on
hirings of older (younger) workers, there are not enough (much) destructions
of younger (older) worker jobs. This implies to subsidy more employment
of older workers, and even to tax the employment of younger workers (for
i · ~ t).
3.4 Revisiting the Role of Firing taxes
Alternatively to the employment tax/subsidy, it is traditional to also consider
￿ring taxes. This implies to also implement hiring subsidies in order to com-
pensate for the e￿ect of these ￿ring taxes on hirings. Indeed another way to
reduce the unemployment of older worker is to protect their employment by
introducing age-increasing ￿ring taxes together with hiring subsidies. How-
ever, this intuition will not be totally valid because of the particular strong
e￿ect of ￿ring taxes at the end of the working life. We ￿rst investigate this
point and then turn to the optimal age-pro￿le of hiring and ￿ring taxes.
3.4.1 On the age-di￿erentiated e￿ect of ￿ring taxes
We argue that, in a life cycle setting, there exists a non-trivial intertemporal
trade-o￿ related to the introduction of ￿ring taxes. To put emphasis on this
result, we consider a constant tax, F, and compare its impact in our life cycle
setting versus in a MP economy (T ! 1).
To that end, let ￿rst notice that, with T ! 1, the productivity threshold
and the labor market tightness would jump on stationary values that we
denote R and µ respectively.
Property 8. If T ! 1, the labor market equilibrium with ￿ring taxes F is
characterized by fR;µg solving:
22c
q(µ)
= ¯(1 ¡ °)
Z ²
R+F
(x ¡ R ¡ F)dG(x)







(x ¡ R ¡ F)dG(x)
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 4 by considering Ri = Ri+1 = R.














8i 2 [2;T ¡ 1]
Proof. Since, on the one hand, dR
dF = ¡(1¡¯) and on the other hand,
dRi
dF =




dF = ¡1, the proof is straightforward.
To get some intuitions on this result, let us consider the particular case




dF = ¡1 implies
dRi
dF < 0 8i. At the end of the working cycle,
introducing a ￿ring tax increases the present ￿ring cost without any future
consequences on the job value as the worker will be retired in the next period.
On the other hand, in an in￿nite horizon, the present ￿ring cost increases in
the same proportion as in our life-cycle model, but the job value decreases,
as the ￿rm rationally expect the future cost of the ￿ring tax. In some sense,
retirement allows ￿rms to escape from the ￿ring tax, leading them to more
labor hoarding for older workers. This suggests that evaluating employment
protection in an in￿nite-lived agents context underestimates the potential
positive impact on employment. The proof of this result in the general spec-
i￿cation where ° > 0 is not trivial, since the larger impact of F on Ri in our
life cycle setting accounts for a lower decrease of µ, hence of wages, than in
an in￿nite-horizon framework.
Nevertheless, for some parametric speci￿cations, we are able to state a
su￿cient condition on the level of F whose implication is a decreasing age-
dynamics of Ri.




b [1¡G(x)]dx, then RT¡1 · Ri+1 ·
Ri 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 1].
Proof. From the de￿nition of Ri in proposition 4, by assuming Fi = F and
ai = Hi = 0, we have







(x ¡ Ri+1 ¡ F)dG(x)
Let de￿ne ª(z) ´
R ²
z (x ¡ z)dG(x)¡°p(µ)
R ²
z+F (x ¡ z ¡ F)dG(x) =
R ²
z [1 ¡ G(x))dx¡
°p(µ)
R ²
z+F [1 ¡ G(x)]dx, it comes ª0(z) < 0, so that if RT¡2 ¸ RT¡1, then
Ri ¸ Ri+1 8i. Then,
RT¡2 ¸ RT¡1 = b ¡ F () F ¸
Z ²
b¡F




which implies that F ¸
R ²
b¡F[1¡G(x)]dx is a su￿cient condition for RT¡2 ¸
RT¡1, hence Ri ¸ Ri+1. Remaining of the proof is straightforward.
This proposition states that the employment protection can be sizeable
enough at the end of the life cycle to imply that older workers face a lower risk
of job destruction than younger ones. This property has strong implications
on the optimal age-dynamics of ￿ring taxes and hiring subsidies.
3.4.2 The optimal age-dynamics of ￿ring taxes and hiring subsi-
dies
Let now consider ai = 0 8i. Firing taxes together with hiring subsidies are
now used to reach the ￿rst best allocation.
Property 10. Let consider ¯ ! 1 and ´(µ?) = °, an optimal age-sequence



















T¡1 = HT¡1 = 0 and µ? and R?
i are de￿ned by proposition 2.
24Proof. Straightforward by comparing propositions 2 and 4 and recalling that R ²
R?




Corollary 3. The optimal age-dynamics of ￿ring taxes and hiring subsidies
is hump-shaped, ￿rst increasing and then decreasing. Let ´(µ?) = °, F ?
i+1 >
Fi 8i < ~ t and F ?
i+1 · Fi 8i ¸ ~ t.
Proof. Straightforward since from R?
i+1 ¸ R?
i, we have ¿?
i+1 · ¿?
i and ¿1 > 1,
¿T¡1 < 1.
This hump-shaped pro￿le comes from two opposite forces:
² as previously stated, there are too much (not enough) destructions for
older (younger) workers, which would require, everything else being
equal, an increasing pro￿le of ￿ring taxes and hiring subsidies.
² there is an additional force (with respect to the case of the employment
subsidy) because the ￿ring tax speci￿cally introduces an intertemporal
trade o￿: the ￿rm can avoid the tax by waiting for the worker retire-
ment. In words, at the end of the life cycle, a lower tax is enough to
reduce ￿rings of older workers, because ￿rms have strong incentives to
wait for retirement of the worker. This suggests that although oldest
workers are responsible for large negative externalities on hirings of
younger workers, it is optimal to implement a lower ￿ring tax at the
end of the life cycle.13
4 Robustness
This section examines robustness of our results regarding two assumptions:
(i) non-age directed recruiting policies and (ii) constant search e￿ort of un-
employed workers.
Firstly, we show that, even though ￿rms could implement age-directed
recruitment policies, unemployed workers’ search strategy among the set of
sub-markets would lead the equilibrium to be ex-ante non-directed.
Secondly, introducing endogenous unemployed search e￿ort is found to
reinforce our main results: at the equilibrium, search e￿ort is decreasing
with age and the older worker search is less worthy to be encouraged as it
exerts a negative congestion e￿ect on the younger unemployed workers.
13Another way to understand this result would consist of considering an equilibrium
distortion which would be not age related, let say a constant unemployment bene￿t denoted
z. In such case, the optimal shape of ￿ring tax would be age decreasing, that is Fi =
z + Fi+1 with FT¡1 = z.
254.1 Age-directed Search
The non age-directed search hypothesis appeared to play a key role in the
preceding results: it generates an intergenerational externality which was at
the heart of the market equilibrium sub-optimality. Obviously, if the model
environment allows to use T ¡1 matching technologies, one for each age, this
speci￿c externality would disappear.
Let consider age-directed recruitment policies, so that we de￿ne the prob-
ability of ￿lling a vacancy as q(µi) ´
M(vi;ui)
vi for the ￿rm. In that context,
any ￿rm is free to open a job vacancy and engage in hiring directed to worker






















T(²) = 0, no ￿rm search for workers of age T ¡ 1, that is µT¡1 = 0.
The zero-pro￿t condition Vi = 0 8i 2 (1;T ¡ 2) allows us to determine the










This equation implies that di￿erences in expected values of jobs according to
the worker’s ages have to be associated with consistent di￿erences in expected
recruitment costs. Lower expected values for older workers requires lower
expected recruiting costs. However, this age-directed strategy will not be
validated by unemployed workers’ search among the set of sub-markets and
will not exist at the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. There is no stable equilibrium allocation with age-directed
search.
Proof. Because there is no age-dependent ability requirement associated with
the vacancy position in our model14, an employed worker of age i 6= j or j
gives rise to the same output ² into a job ex-ante age-directed toward a worker
14If in turn we would have considered that only workers of a given age can apply to
age i-directed vacancies because of technological/organizational considerations, let say
job production is hi;j² with hi;i = 1 and hi;j = 0 with j 6= i, then an age-directed
search equilibrium would exist. Furthermore, since this equilibrium no longer features
intergenerationnal search externalities, the Hosios condition would achieve e￿ciency (proof
available upon request).
26of age j. The expected value of an unemployed worker of age i who searches
in an age j segment is as follows:
U
d





























It is then obvious that a worker of age i has incentives to search in
sub-market j instead of i, until he expects a higher probability of contact:
Ud
i;j > Ud
i () p(µj) > p(µi) () µj > µi. Consequently, perfect mobility
of unemployed workers among sub-markets implies that µi = µj 8i;j, and
￿nally Ud
i;j = Ud
i;i 8i;j. The age-directed search strategy of ￿rms is then not
validated by the strategy of unemployed workers.
The condition (13), which relies on the assumption that only ui unem-
ployed of workers of age i apply to i-type vacancy positions cannot hold in
equilibrium. Instead, in each sub-market 1
T¡1
PT¡1
i=1 ui unemployed workers
apply to the vacant positions, with the same distribution of ages as in the non-
directed search equilibrium. In turn, in each sub-market vj = v=[T ¡ 1] 8j





i=1 ui)=(T¡1) = v
u and u are de￿ned by proposition 1.
Even though age-directed search is technologically possible, the equilib-
rium features ex-ante only non-directed recruiting policies.
4.2 The Role of Endogenous Unemployed Search E￿ort
We propose to extend the benchmark case (with non age-directed search)
to unemployment search. We analyze both the market equilibrium outcome
and its e￿ciency. As workers come closer to retirement age, the return to
search should decrease, reinforcing the decline in older worker employment.
Let ei be the endogenous search e￿ort for a worker of age i, the total
number of hirings is now given by M(v;
P
i uiei). Then, from the perspective






~ e where ~ e is
the average search e￿ort (by de￿nition ~ e ´
P
i uiei P
i ui ). The probability for
unemployed workers of age i to be employed at age i+1 is eip(µ)[1¡G(Ri+1]
where µ ´ v=[
P











+eip(µ)G(Ri+1)Ui+1 + (1 ¡ eip(µ))Ui+1]g











Search e￿ort is decreasing with age, since the expected surplus related to
employment is decreasing with i; ultimately, eT¡1 = 0.
Proposition 6. Let restate jci = eip(µ)[1 ¡ G(Ri+1)], the equilibrium allo-
cation is characterized by Ri+1 ¸ Ri and ei+1 · ei, so that jdi+1 ¸ jdi and
jci+1 · jci.
This result states that the search e￿ort of workers in addition of the job
destruction of ￿rms contributes to decrease job creation ￿ows as the retire-
ment age is coming.
















subject to the constraints:
ui+1 = G(R
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28Let consider ¯ ! 1 and ´(µ?) = °. It is straightforward to see that even if
µ = µ?, ei di￿ers from e?
i, and the optimal level of search e￿ort for younger
(older) workers have to be higher (lower) than at equilibrium. To understand
this result, let think about the optimal age pattern of a subsidy conditional
to the level of search e￿ort, siei. The instantaneous utility of a unemployed
worker is then b¡Á(ei)+siei. Let also introduce for instance an employment
subsidy ai as before, to achieve e￿ciency, that is µ = µ?, Ri = R?
i and ei = e?
i.
Property 11. Let consider ¯ ! 1 and ´(µ?) = °, an optimal age-sequence
















Corollary 4. The optimal age-dynamics of employment and search e￿ort




i 8i 2 [0;T ¡ 1],
and there exists a threshold age ~ t such that ai · 0;si ¸ 0 8i 2 [0;~ t] and
ai ¸ 0;si · 0 8i 2 [~ t;T ¡ 1].
This suggests that is not only optimal to subsidy employment of older
workers but also to tax search e￿ort of these workers. Both these results
are consistent with the idea that unemployed older workers exert a negative
externality on the other unemployed workers. This result gives some theoret-
ical arguments to the existence of pre-retirement schemes in some European
countries.
5 Conclusion
Because the horizon of older workers is shorter, ￿rms and workers invest less
in job-search and labor-hoarding activities at the end of the life cycle: hiring
(￿ring) rate decreases (increases) with age. As younger workers start as
unemployed, the age-dynamics of employment is hump-shaped. This result
shows that the normal retirement age is the key institution which governs the
employment rate of older workers. Countries with a low retirement age would
also su￿er from a depressed employment rate for older workers relatively early
in ages. This may explain why countries with a retirement age around 60 like
France, Belgium has also a lower employment rate for workers aged between
55 and 59 than those with a retirement age of 65 like Sweden, the United
States.
29We show that this age-pro￿le of job creations and job destructions is an
equilibrium outcome that appears particularly robust in the life-cycle frame-
work. However, age-policies are necessary to reach the optimal social output
when the labor market is not segmented by age. At equilibrium, there are
indeed not enough (too much) job destructions for older (younger) work-
ers. This feature comes from the existence of a negative e￿ect exerted by
unemployed older workers on the expected vacancy return which penalizes
the other unemployed workers. This is why it is optimal to subsidy the em-
ployment of older workers. It does not however imply that increasing ￿ring
taxes during the life cycle are optimal as ￿ring costs are very e￿cient for em-
ployment protection when the retirement age is coming. Concerning labor
supply, we show that it could be optimal to discourage search e￿ort of the
older workers. For a given retirement age, these results give some rationales
to age policies, such as pre-retirement, implemented in some European coun-
tries.
This paper assumed that workers only di￿er respectively to their distance
from deterministic retirement. In that context, age-directed recruitment poli-
cies cannot exist in equilibrium because there are any ability or organizational
age-requirement associated with jobs in the economy under study. As our
study gives strong importance to the non-segmented features both at the
positive and normative levels, a next issue could be to study the conditions
under which age-segmented labor market could arise and their welfare impli-
cations. However, as it was already emphasized by Kaufman and Spilerman
[1982], whether or not there exists such rationales for age-segmented markets
is an empirical disputed issue.
Beyond its theoretical interest, we believe that the life-cycle unemploy-
ment approach is able to deliver realistic empirical predictions. We have
already emphasized that some qualitative features such as the drop in the
employment rate at proximity of the retirement age are very well replicated.
It remains to assess the quantitative performance of this approach. It cer-
tainly implies to take into account other features of the life cycle. The ￿rst
candidate is human capital, both through initial training and experience
accumulated during the working life. It could be interesting to study its
interplay with labor market institutions in the line of Wasmer [2004]. We
think that the life cycle unemployment framework provides a very promising
research agenda.
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A The extended model with policy
Let us denote Hi a lump sum paid to the employer when a new worker of age
i is hired, Fi the ￿ring cost and ai the the employment subsidy for employed
workers. We follow MP by considering that the wage structure that arises as
a Nash bargaining solution has two tiers. The ￿rst tier wage re￿ects the fact
that hiring subsidy is directly relevant to the decision to accept a match and
that the possibility of incurring ￿ring costs in the future a￿ects the value the
employer places on the match. In turn, the second tier wage applies when
￿ring costs are directly relevant to a continuation decision.
Let the subscript i = 0 index the initial wage and the value of a job under
the terms of the two-tier contract, ￿rms’ value functions solve:
























Ji+1(x)dG(x) + ¯G(Ri+1)(V ¡ Fi+1)
Ji(²) = ² ¡ wi(²) + ¯
Z ²
Ri+1
Ji+1(x)dG(x) + ¯G(Ri+1)(V ¡ Fi+1)







Adding the free entry condition, V = 0, it emerges that labor market tight-




























i = Ri + Fi ¡ Hi (17)
Let us now examine the derivation of the two-tier wage structure. The lat-








i (²) + Hi + W
0





Wi(²) ¡ Ui = ° [Ji(²) ¡ (V ¡ Fi) + Wi(²) ¡ Ui] ) wi(²) (19)
so that the equations for the initial and subsequent wage bargaining are (see
appendix B.2 for details):
w
0
i = (1 ¡ °)(b ¡ ai = +°
Ã









dG(x) + Hi ¡ ¯Fi+1
!
wi(²) = (1 ¡ °)(b ¡ ai) + °
Ã









dG(x) + Fi ¡ ¯Fi+1
!
33which implies R0
i = Ri + Fi ¡ Hi.
Remaining of the proof is then straightforward by noticing that J0
i+1(²) =
1¡° and Ji(Ri) = ¡Fi implies that Ji(²) = (1¡°)(²¡Ri)¡Fi, and similarly
J0
i (²) = (1 ¡ °)(² ¡ R0
i) ¡ Hi.
B Wage equations derivations
B.1 Wage equations (8) and (9)
The sharing rule (7) can be written as:
¡(1 ¡ °)Ui = ° [Ji(²) + Wi(²)] ¡ Wi(²) (20)
From value functions (3),(5) and (6), it turns out to be that:













[Ji+1(x) + Wi+1(x)]dG(x) = °¯
Z ²
Ri+1


















so that (21) can be written as:
° [Ji(²) + Wi(²)] ¡ Wi(²) = °² ¡ wi(²) ¡ (1 ¡ °)¯Ui+1 (22)
34Incorporate this in (20) yields (8):
wi(²) = °² + (1 ¡ °)[Ui ¡ ¯Ui+1]
Then, let notice that the unemployed value (6), from the sharing rule (20)
and the free entry (2), solves in equilibrium:





(Wi+1(x) ¡ Ui+1)dG(x) + Ui+1
¸





































where make use of p(µ)=q(µ) = µ and
R ²
Ri+1 Ji+1(x)dG(x) = (1 ¡ °)
R ²
Ri+1[1 ¡
G(x)]dx by integrating by parts. Substitute out for Ui ¡ ¯Ui+1 from this
expression into wi(²) one gets (9).




i (²) = w
0










The sharing rule (18) ￿rst can be written as:























i (²) = °² ¡ w
0
i(²) ¡ (1 ¡ °)(ai + ¯Ui+1) ¡ °¯Fi+1 (24)
35which implies by combining with (23):
w
0
i(²) = ° (² + Hi ¡ ¯Fi+1) + (1 ¡ °)(Ui ¡ ¯Ui+1 ¡ ai)
Then, from J00
i (²) = 1 ¡ ° and J0
i (R0
i) = ¡Hi, J0
i (²) = (1 ¡ °)(² ¡ R0
i) ¡ Hi
and it comes:






































so that we derive (20).
Similarly , from
¡°Fi ¡ (1 ¡ °)Ui = ° [Ji(²) + Wi(²)] ¡ Wi(²)
we obtain
wi(²) = ° (² + Fi ¡ ¯Fi+1) + (1 ¡ °)(Ui ¡ ¯Ui+1 ¡ ai)
and remaining of the proof to derive wi(²) is straightforward.
C Proofs of propositions, properties and corol-
laries
C.1 Proof of property 3
Let us denote ª(Ri+1;µ) =
G(Ri+1)
[1¡p(µ)]G(Ri+1)+p(µ) ´ ªi+1, so that in equilibrium
ªi · ªi+1 < 1 from Ri+1 ¸ Ri. Accordingly, (1) implies that:
ni ? ni+1 () ui+1 ? ui () ªi+1 ? ui
For u1 = 1, since ª1 < 1, it is straightforward to see that u2 < u1, hence
n2 > n1. Then, from ªi+1 ¸ ªi > ª1 8i, there exists an age ~ T which veri￿es
u ~ T = ª ~ T+1, so that u ~ T+1 ¸ u ~ T () n ~ T+1 · n ~ T.
36C.2 Proof of property 4
Let combine wi(Ri) from (1) and substitute out
R ²
Ri+1[1 ¡ G(x)]dx for Ri in
this expression yields:












C.3 Proof of proposition 2
Let us denote ¸i and ¹i the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraints



















xdG(x) ¡ ¸i[1 ¡ G(Ri+1)]
¶
















Substitute out for ¹i = 1, hence ¸i = Ri+1, remaining of the proof is straight-
forward with the de￿nition p0(µ) = [1 ¡ ´(µ)]q(µ).
37